This group, which sees itself as religiously superior to the Muslim Sunna world, especially with respect to their ability to improve and enrich religious meta-data by real ijtihad, is extremely fearful of modernization and progress. Archived from on 22 February 2009. According to one first hand testimony, suspicions were allegedly spread and reputations compromised leading Bahá'ís to treat inquirers badly who would then be recruited to the anti-Bahá'í movement. He denies this and said that if anyone finds a connection between him and Hojjatieh, he will denounce everything he stands for. Relevant discussion may be found on the. However, since the Shah's regime, in Halabi's view, allowed the Baha'is too much freedom, he then supported Khomeini's movement to overthrow the Shah. An earlier organization was founded by Halabi, the Anjoman-e Imám-e Zaman called Anjoman-e Zedd-e Bahá'í privately which later was renamed to the Anjoman-e Hojjatieh Mahdavieh called Hojjatieh for short after the.
Iran can be proud of its ability to create its own technological and educational capabilities, despite and maybe owing to the international sanctions and embargo. Bernard Lewis actually asked this same question in the context of the Sunna Muslim world, after realizing that after more than a millennium of consistent failures, it cannot, is unable to, and probably unwilling to restore Islam to its golden era. These accusations mainly arose from the reputations of these agencies, the fear they raised among the clerics, and the knowledge that the above agencies were not only professional, sophisticated, and efficient but that, probably, only they could have carried out such professional and deadly operations against such prominent religious figures as the Forqan allegedly had done. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. The Hojjatiyeh was dismissed in 1983 by Khomeini, but it seems it never truly left the political sphere until today, when its traces can still be found on Iranian politics. .
Even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his mentor the Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi are reported to be Hojjatiyeh members. Following the toppling of Mosaddegh, the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, allowed their activities. In March to June 1955, the period that year, a widespread systematic program was undertaken cooperatively by the government and the clergy. The Upheavals in the Middle East: The Theory and Practice of a Revolution Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014. Register a Free 1 month Trial Account. The Hojjatiyeh Society is one of the most fascinating religious groups in modern Iran.
The story of the Shi'a -- 2. The E-mail message field is required. Since the 1980s, Hojjatieh has been frequently cited in unfounded conspiracy theories which claim that real power lies in hands of people who are secretly affiliated with Hojjatieh. Today, its traces can still be found in Iranian politics. It is noteworthy that while Hojjatieh generally renounces all Islamic and other governments before the arrival of the twelfth Imam as illegitimate or at least unnecessary, Mesbah Yazdi recommends and gives full authority to the pre-messianic Islamic government. The group also opposes both and Ruhollah Khomeini's heterodox concept of , which mainline Shi'a clergy viewed as heretical.
The society started its way in the 1950s as an anti-Baha'i movement but found itself fighting Khomeini's Velayat-i Faqih and leading an anti-Khomeini and messianic agenda. The group flourished during the 1979 Iranian Revolution that ousted the Shah and installed an Islamic government in his place. Cohen is a lecturer in the Department of Israel and Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University Center, Israel. Politicians and clerics exiled from influence under the reformist President Khatami have seized their chance to get back in to power and push an uncompromising foreign policy agenda. The Baha'i faith and the emergence of the Hojjatiyeh: 3.
Ayrıca son bölümde Ayetullah Misbah Yezdi ve Eski Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmedinejad'ın cemaatle ilgilerinin irdelendiği bölümler de kaydadeğer. For more than 130 years, the clerics in Iran have been engaged in a real struggle with modernization. The president of Iran from 2005—2013 is also rumored to be an advocate of Hojjatieh through the influence of Ayatollah Yazdi, who was his mentor. At the end of the day, this day, it all fell to pieces in his own hands—hands that aimed to build Iran into a global empire. The problem is that once you have gotten your nifty new product, the the hojjatiyeh society in iran cohen ronen a gets a brief glance, maybe a once over, but it often tends to get discarded or lost with the original packaging. While the Hojjatiyeh was banned form official politics by Khomeini in 1983, it seems the society never truly left the political sphere.
Despite the Hojjatiyeh's fight against Khomeini, the Hojjatiyeh became, unwillingly and unintentionally, a leading faction in the Islamic Revolution, with its members coming to occupy some of the highest echelon posts in Iranian politics. Cohen'in kitabında, Hüccetiye'nin yanısıra Şeyhiyye, Babîlik ve Bahaîlik gibi Şiilik temelli tarikat ve cemaatler, ayrıca Şiilik içindeki felsefi-teolojik tartışmalar ve Ahbarî-Usulî ayrımı da gayet başarılı şekilde ele alınmış. Cohen is a lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies and Political Science at Ariel University, Israel and a research fellow at Ariel's Middle East Research Center. Reviews 'Highly original, rich in detail, and timely. The late Shah had the same influence, though on other regional states, but if we can make any comparison with the current regime, his influence was more dedicated to regional affairs rather than domestic ones. Kitaptaki en dikkat çekici bölüm ise Hüccetiye'nin kurucusu Şeyh Mahmud Halebî'nin Pehlevi Şahları, Kum Uleması ve bilahare İslam Devrimi sonrası Ayetullah Humeyni'yle yaşadığı tartışmalar ve 1983'te yasaklanması sonrası 'yeraltına çekildiği' dönemin anlatıldığı kısım. The society started its way in the 1950s as an anti-Baha'i movement but found itself fighting Khomeini's Velayat-i Faqih and leading an anti-Khomeini and messianic agenda.
His research mainly focuses on Iranian Studies and regional politics and he has written and edited several books and monographs as well as numerous academic articles and commentaries and has occasionally been interviewed on radio shows and in newspapers. According to the , the organization was strictly and totally opposed to violence and persecution: As the leaders of Ḥojjatiya were committed to a non-violent, persuasive strategy in dealing with Bahais, the Association did not take part in persecution of Bahais in post-revolutionary Iran. The Ulama challenged his very contention and finally brought about his execution in 1850. The ulama, it is true, defended their divergent political positions through their interpretations of the Islamic laws. Ezcümle, Hüccetiye ekseninde Mesiyanik-Mehdici hareketler ve Şiilik tarihi-teolojisi üzerine gayet kıymetli ve okunası bir eser. Among the most curious things that took place during the Islamic Revolution of Iran were the actions carried out by the Forqan against prominent Mullahs during its first year from 1979—1980, when all the revolutionary organizations and groups were trying to find their way and place in the new political scene. The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization Sussex Academic Press, 2009.
Post-revolution era and the Hojjatiyeh as counter-revolutionaries movement: 5. It is also reported that , who was to have been Ahmedinejad's First Vice President, may be a Hojjatieh member, but the source of this information is unclear. Nevertheless, there have been mentions of it again circa 2002-2004. Öte yandan, dikkatli gözler için, İran Devleti-Hüccetiye ilişkileri tecrübesinin, din-devlet-cemaatler üçgeninde İslam toplumları açısından önemli çıkarımlar sağladığını da vurgulamak lazım. His departure was an admission of his great failure to stabilize the political upheavals and his blindness to the revolutionary flames orchestrated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Thus the content of the Usuli teachings of Shi'ism, as well as its specific modes of discourse put limits on the range of ideologically defensible political actions. Danger ahead -- challenging Khomeini -- 6.