Nor does it lie in a denial of scepticism, voluntarism, wilfulness, and power out of a desire to secure either a liberal polity or political understanding from their purportedly destructive effects. Realism is commonly portrayed as theory that reduces international relations to pure power politics. It is an achievement: a value and a practice to be fostered in the name of individuality, security, and a maximum degree of liberty. It is a recognition of the limits of knowledge — a difficult acknowledgement of finitude and limitation in the face of powerful desires for security and the powerful attraction of claims to omniscience. To make this case, I look at three such divisions: Realism versus liberalism, rationalism versus constructivism, and modernism versus postmodernism. As in the cases of Hobbes and Rousseau, it did not take long to discover that this view bore little resemblance to reality.
Shipping customers please pay online by PayPal or Credit Card, you must checkout via our website. By understanding its essence — its narrow conceptual specificity — it is possible to see the logic of political conflict, and the possibilities for its amelioration. Morgenthau is often accused of initiating a Realist tradition that marginalised, or even excluded, the role of ideas in international politics, and of having an almost incomprehensibly narrow and simplistic concept of politics itself. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement. Simson, New Jersey: Humanities Press. It is not difficult to discern a degree of mythologisation in these calls for a return to Realism.
Authors from Thucydides to Kant were not ignorant of political, social, cultural diversities, and different peoples and political communities. In reconstructing a tradition, it is often asked, does not one fall prey to the error of believing or contributing to the idea that there is such a thing as a or the tradition, or even clearly identifiable traditions at all? A second, more substantive, response is that far from either being ignorant of the claims of social science or modern rationalism, wilful Realism can be understood as posing a direct challenge to those claims. Should we, nevertheless, play down certain kinds of knowledge or limit research in some areas? Treating Realism as emerging within the broader problematic of political modernity, by contrast, shows that the relationship between Realism and liberalism is much closer and more complex. Materialist and rationalist practices allow the shared construction of concepts of interest, power, and action, and provide the basis for common calculation and adjustment even when Sovereigns are at odds with each other. For Morgenthau, the belief that scientific knowledge and political knowledge occupy the same realms needs to be challenged not only in order to dismiss the rationalist attempt to reduce the latter to the former, it needs to be challenged in order that the failure of the rationalist project does not lead to theoretical conclusions that are disastrous as a foundation for liberal political practice. It is an attempt to reconcile principles of universal right with political effect, to give abstract right political power. Yet whatever stance one takes, there is little doubt that despite continual declarations of its irrelevance or imminent demise, Realism remains at the heart of theoretical and political dispute in world politics, constituting a continuing reference point against which competing positions consistently define themselves and a conceptual and rhetorical fulcrum around which both analytic and political debates revolve.
Hobbes, of course, believes that the Sovereign is justified in forcing citizens to go to war, but he nonetheless feels it would be unwise and unreasonable to force them to do so too often or in situations where the judgements of threat decided upon by the Sovereign are shaky enough and risky enough potentially to erode its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. It is also a much broader critique of the corruption which Rousseau sees as characterising modern societies and the governments which preside over them. Parliamentary institutions, likewise, become little more than venues for the pursuit of narrow sectoral interests, valued by those who participate in them only to the degree that they advance their interests. See, for example, the varying perspectives put forward in Gunther Hellmann ed. Even a politics of toleration will involve some form of imposition, since the limits of that which is tolerable must ultimately be decided.
Acting within the logic of worst case scenarios, Hobbesian individuals create an anarchic state of nature in part out of their fear of future harm rather than the calm appraisal of current realities. This is a book that all realists and their critics should ponder. On the broader legal context see David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Rothstein Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. So long as its basic institutions are functioning internally a liberal state will actually disregard them as something to be defended. In particular, it seemed that by taking the thought of these canonical figures more seriously, and reopening the questions with which they struggled, it might be possible to contribute to a reconstruction of a Realist tradition in ways that both brought out their historical concerns and altered their contemporary significance. Rather, the core of moral judgement and practical wisdom lies in the capacity of individuals to recognise their condition, to see themselves and others in the context of mutual moral and epistemic diversity and limitation, as well as their desires for power, and to construct social and political relations that — within this difficult and limiting context — maximise the degree of moral recognition and autonomy granted to each individual, while minimising the degree of violence within and between polities.
No consistent individualism can entrust to someone other than to the individual himself the right to dispose of the physical life of the individual. It is certainly true that na¨ıve forms of liberal empiricism, rationalism, and utilitarianism have been the continual target of wilful Realist criticism. These can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party. See the fascinating treatment in Shapin and Schaeffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump. Thrasymachus and Realism — Crooked TimberTwo outstanding books from Cambridge University Press: Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations 2000 , more an undergrad textbook. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
Schmitt develops his arguments with direct and selfconscious echoes of the tradition of absolute sovereignty and the need for authoritative decision which he identifies with Hobbes. But what shall force the army? Rousseau does not deny the problems of power, conflict, and insecurity which are the mainstays of realpolitik. While he regards this form of thought as epistemically one might currently say, methodologically more sophisticated than classical liberalism, he views it as politically even more na¨ıve, dangerous, and destructive of the principles it seeks to support. Instead, it provided a basis upon which modern science and knowledge claims could be produced and contested in an 45 46 47 Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, p. As pure objectivism and instrumentality, moreover, 53 Quoted in Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, Goethe: Two Essays Princeton University Press, 1945 , p. This is a book that all realists and their critics should ponder.
Indeed they frequently overwhelm material interests, and are at the heart of the dynamics of fear, distrust, and animosity. Williams 2005 This book is in copyright. The construction of a material self, a recognition of others in similar terms, and the creation of a political culture and sovereign power based upon such principles is not, for Hobbes, an assumption or an objective fact. If conflict was eliminated, then virtù would stagnate and political leaders would degenerate into hubris. Finally, and admittedly more speculatively, it is possible to conceive how the principles of legitimacy upon which the practice of sovereignty is based — that is, legitimate action in the eyes of citizens — might become transnationalised to a point at which juridically absolute Sovereigns would nonetheless be practically constrained by their limits. This classification is echoed in virtually every major analysis; see, for example, F.